Virtual IBANs: What the BaFin supervisory notice means for institutions
Virtual IBANs (vIBANs) facilitate the automated allocation of payments and are used in various payment models. However, particularly in multi-tiered and cross-border structures, they can pose significant transparency and control risks for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) draws attention to these risks in its Supervisory Notice 06/2026 (A) of July 27, 2026. This notice is based, among other things, on joint findings with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) regarding informal financial transfer systems (underground banking).
At a glance
- What applies: BaFin does not question the validity of vIBANs, but expects transparency down to the end-customer level in multi-tiered and cross-border structures. This supervisory notice is valid until July 10, 2027.
- What is binding: The notification does not create any new obligations. It specifies the provisions of the Money Laundering Act (GwG), the Banking Act (KWG), and the Payment Services Supervision Act (ZAG). However, the general ruling on account retrieval files from 2020 is directly binding for credit institutions.
- Was zu tun ist: Inventory now, contracts and monitoring by the end of the first quarter of 2027, AMLR readiness by July 2027 (see roadmap below).
Why virtual IBANs can pose risks
Virtual IBANs are identifiers in IBAN format that are assigned to a customer or a payment transaction without necessarily being linked to a separate payment account. Incoming payments are instead routed to a central clearing account, the so-called master account.
Multi-stage models (re-issuing) are particularly relevant. In this model, a payment service provider passes on viBANs to its own customers. This can create a transparency gap for the account-holding credit institution: it may only know the payment service provider, but not the end customers and their beneficial owners.
An additional challenge arises with cross-border models. For example, if a vIBAN has a German country code, while the associated master account is held abroad, an incorrect domestic connection may occur.
The crucial factor is therefore not only the technical use of virtual IBANs, but also the question of how traceable the underlying customer relationships and payment flows are for the participating institutions.
BaFin and FIU see concrete risks of abuse.
Supervisory experience shows that such transparency gaps can also be exploited for illegal financial transactions. Complex structures can make it difficult to identify those involved and to trace the economic background.
According to BaFin, the FIU has detected large-volume payment flows through internationally operating companies involving payment service providers from Hong Kong and China, often with generic payment purposes. BaFin believes this supports the assumption of increased fraud and money laundering risks associated with complex vIBAN structures.
To better identify and assess corresponding risks, BaFin specifies various indicators. These relate to the structure of payment systems, the available customer data, and transaction behavior.
For the assessment of these risks , BaFin specifically cites the following indicators:
- Structure: numerous vIBANs for the master account of a foreign payment service provider, especially from a third country; the intermediation of several payment service providers; complex international payment routes.
- Customers and data: Indications of incomplete recording of customer and address data or information on beneficial owners by the payment service provider; high payment receipts from possible shell companies; indications of shell companies on the part of the payment recipients.
- Transactions: High volumes without discernible economic activity; generic or unclear uses; short usage periods of the viBANs or conspicuously fast account turnover; fragmented or economically implausible transaction patterns; an implausible connection between trading transactions and payment flows.
For practical assessment, an important distinction must be observed: The indicators, taken individually, do not constitute a suspicion or a reporting obligation, but must be evaluated in a documented overall assessment.
If there are indications that an asset originates from a criminal offense that could constitute a predicate offense for money laundering, or is related to the financing of terrorism, it must be reported to the FIU immediately (Section 43 Paragraph 1 of the Money Laundering Act). A suspicion under criminal procedure is not required for this.
What BaFin expects from institutions
The risks described give rise to specific requirements for handling virtual IBANs. This supervisory notice does not create any new legal obligations, but rather clarifies the supervisory standard for the risk-oriented fulfillment of existing obligations.
The type and intensity of the measures depend on the complexity of the structure, the number of payment service providers involved, and the transparency regarding end customers. In the case of multi-stage, cross-border, or foreign-influenced models, it must be regularly assessed whether enhanced due diligence obligations pursuant to Section 15 of the German Money Laundering Act (GwG) apply.
The focus is particularly on transparency regarding end customers and beneficial owners, as well as up-to-date information on the business model and controls of integrated payment service providers. This also includes plausibility checks of payment flows, risk-oriented transaction monitoring, and regular training.
In addition to these supervisory expectations, credit institutions must comply with another requirement. Since 2020, there has been a directly binding regulation regarding the recording of virtual IBANs in the account information database. According to the BaFin general ruling of December 8, 2020, virtual IBANs issued to payment service providers for forwarding must be recorded in the account information database pursuant to Section 24c of the German Banking Act (KWG). The payment service provider must be specified as the account holder, and the end customer or the last authorized person must be specified as the authorized signatory or beneficial owner.
As an administrative act, the general ruling is directly binding on its addressees.
Roadmap: Three phases to AMLR
In addition to existing requirements, institutions must prepare for the EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), which will apply from July 10, 2027. They have approximately nine months until then to review existing vIBAN structures and prepare necessary adjustments.
A three-phase approach is recommended. First, institutions should create transparency regarding existing models and potential risks. Building on this, contractual and operational measures can be implemented before data models and processes are aligned with the requirements of the AMLR.
- Phase 1 – immediately (until the end of 2026): Inventory all vIBAN models with master accounts, payment service providers, intermediaries and country codes; check the account retrieval file for completeness; supplement the risk analysis according to § 5 GwG and document the decision on enhanced due diligence for each model.
- Phase 2 – until the end of the first quarter of 2027: Tighten contracts with payment service providers, expand transaction monitoring to include BaFin indicators, and train the relevant departments.
- Phase 3 – until July 10, 2027: Align the data model and processes with Article 22 Paragraph 3 AMLR, conduct random checks on payment service providers and verify the effectiveness of the measures.
This staggered approach allows institutions to first identify existing transparency gaps and then specifically address the affected processes and controls.
Recommendations for practice
Beyond the requirements described, further organizational and technical measures can help improve transparency regarding virtual IBANs. Particularly in complex structures, it is crucial to consolidate information about participating payment service providers, end customers, and transactions in a traceable manner.
The following recommendations go beyond the supervisory communication and do not constitute minimum supervisory requirements:
- Check correspondence relationship: In the case of master accounts for payment service providers from third countries, it should be examined, in our view, whether a correspondence relationship within the meaning of the German Money Laundering Act (GwG) may exist; in this case, the increased obligations pursuant to Section 15 Paragraph 3 No. 4 in conjunction with Paragraph 7 of the GwG apply.
- Contractual protection: Agreements should be made regarding the right to disclose end-customer data with fixed deadlines (guideline: five working days according to Art. 22 para. 3 AMLR), the requirement of consent for disclosure to further intermediaries, as well as audit and termination rights.
- Central vIBAN register: Link each viBAN to the master account, payment service provider, end customer, opening and closing date, and regularly compare it with the account retrieval file.
- Monitoring at the end-customer level: Use vIBAN-specific scenarios (e.g., throughput rates, lifetime, name variations) and include results of the verification of payee and the sanctions screening of end customers.
- Governance and communication: Release new vIBAN models via the new product process, define exit criteria and, when responding to inquiries from payment service providers, observe the prohibition of information disclosure pursuant to Section 47 of the Money Laundering Act (GwG).
Outlook: EU Money Laundering Regulation
from 10 July 2027
With the implementation of the AMLR on July 10, 2027, the regulatory framework for virtual IBANs will also change. The current BaFin supervisory notice is valid until this date. However, this time limit applies only to the notice itself. The risks and the obligation to consider them remain.
The AMLR defines the vIBAN for the first time (Art. 2 para. 1 no. 26) and obliges credit and financial institutions in Art. 22 para. 3 to identify the users of the vIBANs they issue. The account-holding institution must be able to obtain the data for identifying the natural person using the vIBAN from the issuing institution no later than five working days after the request. Furthermore, according to Art. 16 of the 6th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the central account registers must be extended to include vIBANs (implementation into national law is required).
For institutions, transparency regarding the actual users of virtual IBANs is therefore relevant both under existing regulatory expectations and with regard to the AMLR (Administrative Model Law). Those who already make the necessary information available down to the end-customer level and review the associated processes create a foundation for meeting current requirements and preparing for the AMLR.
Sources
- BaFin: Supervisory Notice 06/2026 (A) – Risks of virtual IBANs in connection with underground banking (27.07.2026)
- BaFin: “Money laundering: BaFin wants to curb the risks of virtual IBANs” (July 27, 2026)
- BaFin interview with Birgit Rodolphe: “Virtual IBANs can be Trojan horses” (July 27, 2026)
- BaFin: General ruling on the storage of data on virtual IBANs pursuant to Section 24c Paragraph 1 of the German Banking Act (08.12.2020)
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 – EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation
- Directive (EU) 2024/1640 – 6th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive; Money Laundering Act; Banking Act

Sophie Karl
